W ithout doubt, management science and operations research (MS/OR) add value to organizations when used well. Authors describing applications in Interfaces routinely document value added. Recently, authors have combined MS/OR with information technology to create strategic advantages with striking results in a variety of industries [Bell 1998a [Bell , 1998b .
Despite the documented success of MS/OR in general, the value of decision analysis (DA) is more difficult to demonstrate. In part, this is because many DA projects are one time only. As a result, it is not easy to measure the value of the chosen course of action relative to paths not taken. If a firm uses DA to decide which market to enter, for example, it is difficult to measure the value of the analysis. Eventually the firm will realize earnings from the new market, but it can only estimate earnings that might have come from markets it did not pursue.
While decision analysts have difficulty measuring the dollar value of one-time DA projects, they also commonly believe that DA adds value beyond the bottom line. Such contributions include facilitating discussions among stakeholders with different preferences, providing a common language for discussing elements of a decision problem and focusing on specific disagreements, and helping to build consensus, which in turn speeds implementation. Such contributions can improve the overall functioning of the organization, thereby contributing to the bottom line. However, measuring their value is problematic. One method is to use an expectedvalue-of-modeling approach. As analysts typically do in DA to calculate the expected value of information, they can consider ex ante the difference in expected value between the DA-recommended alternative and the organization's preferred alternative without analysis. Brown [1994] , Kiesler [1992] , Nickerson and Boyd [1980] , and Watson and Brown [1978] have taken this approach. Although normatively compelling, this approach is difficult to put into practice because of the difficulty of judging in advance what an analysis may recommend.
Many researchers and practitioners avoid the problem of measuring DA outcomes entirely by focusing on the process. That is, instead of trying to show that using DA leads to better organizational performance (for example, profits or shareholder value), they focus on the quality of the decision-making process itself. For example, Matheson and Matheson [1998] took this approach in describing nine principles that they believe characterize the decision-making process in "smart" organizations. A typical reason given for such a focus is that process and outcome in decision making are disconnected; even a good decision process can be followed by an unlucky outcome. Nevertheless, we believe that people and organizations work to improve their decision processes precisely because they hope to improve their chances of getting a preferred outcome or achieving their objectives. Matheson and Matheson [1999] presented preliminary data suggesting a positive correlation between their "organizational IQ" measure and financial performance.
Inability to document the bottom-line value of DA has hampered some analysts as they have tried to gain acceptance for DA within their organizations. Although
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analysts have performed many successful applications and published accounts of them (many in Interfaces), the evidence for DA's value remains largely testimonial and unsystematic. To help fill the gap, we describe a data set based on 178 DA projects performed for Eastman Kodak Company from 1990 to 1999. We collected these data in an ad hoc way rather than as part of a scientific study, and so we do not claim anything more than an interesting retrospective view of the contributions DA made during this period. In several cases, the data document specific dollar values associated with the analysis and allow us to estimate the incremental value of the analysis performed. In many other cases, the projects may not have led to quantitatively measurable outcomes but nevertheless contributed to the firm in some way. Overall, the data reveal much about the role that DA has played in the organization.
Decision Analysis at Eastman Kodak Company
Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester, New York, is the largest manufacturer of photographic products in the world. In 1998, Kodak held assets worth $14.7 billion. Kodak's 1998 sales of $13.4 billion came from four major businesses: consumer imaging ($7.2 billion), Kodak professional ($1.8 billion), health imaging ($1.5 billion), and other imaging ($2.9 billion), which includes entertainment imaging, digital and applied imaging, document imaging, Eastman software, and customer service. Kodak is a worldwide company, with business operations on all continents and manufacturing facilities in nine countries.
Over the past few years, the growth of the digital business; competitive actions, such as pricing, private label, and new product offerings; and heightened expectations from shareholders have challenged company management. In addition, environmental regulations and a strong commitment to environmental responsibility have led to high expenditures. Like many US companies, Kodak downsized considerably during the 1990s.
The industrial engineering department, now combined with a statistics group and called the productivity and quality improvement division (PQID), numbers about 100 people (down from some 400 in 1988) and reports to the US and Canada region manager who reports to the president and COO. The strategy and decisionanalysis group is a small part of one unit within PQID.
Decision and risk analysis (D and RA), a specific form of DA, was introduced at Kodak in the early 1980s under the direction of Terry Faulkner, assistant to the director of research and development. His staff was contracted from the industrial engineering department, which was then part of the management services division (MSD). In 1988 his staff totaled 11. Kenny Oppenheimer of Decision and Risk Analysis, Incorporated, trained the staff in D and RA methodology. Most members of the group held engineering degrees. One had a degree in applied math and another in statistics. Several held master's degrees, often MBAs. One had a doctorate.
The group's original mission was to analyze Kodak's research and development (R and D) portfolio. The company's business-unit (BU) structure had been formed in the mid-1980s; the group sought to work through the BU's product R and D portfolios one at a time. It directed a similar effort toward process R and D.
With the publication of "Strategic intent" [Hamel and Prahalad 1989] and "The core competence of the corporation" [Prahalad and Hamel 1990] , the D and RA group shifted to facilitating crossfunctional corporate teams to create strategies and identify competencies on which to focus. Around the same time, with the advent of digital technologies, the company had to decide how to balance its efforts between analog and digital portfolios and between media and equipment portfolios, and among various segments of the imaging chain (capture, store, transmit, output).
In a 1991 downsizing and reorganization, the company reduced the size of the D and RA group. Terry Faulkner moved on to other responsibilities, eventually becoming the director of strategic initiatives reporting to the CEO. Promotions into managerial positions in the business units, transfers to other functional areas of the company, and retirements decimated the unit. Only two of the original 1988 industrial engineers remained, and they continue to work as decision analysts today. During the 1990s, several other industrial engineers joined the group, but they have since moved to other jobs, retired, or left the company.
Since 1992, the two remaining analysts have worked on an assignment-byassignment basis, relying on clients' wordof-mouth recommendations and their reputations to generate projects. One of these analysts spent the majority of his time on strategy and scenario planning while the other (Kwit) spent most of his time on D and RA before retiring in 2001. Occasionally, they undertook assignments that were not strictly D and RA, sometimes to serve on teams that would eventually need D and RA or to fill temporary needs for industrial engineers. They served as a corporate resource and, as such, were not attached to a business unit or functional area.
The Data
Robert Kwit undertook and kept records for 178 projects from 1990 to 1999 (Table  1 ). The projects include many kinds of work, including strategy development, vendor selection, technical-manufacturingprocess analysis, new-product brainstorming, product-portfolio selection, and emission-reduction analysis. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not list project titles or details. These 178 projects cover a total of 14,372 hours of analyst time over the 10 years. In addition, not included in the list are another 130 hours for miscellaneous small projects and 1,384 hours spent developing and delivering D and RA courses for Kodak managers and staff.
Over the 10 years, data-collection and record-keeping procedures changed: (1) the managers of the division to which Industrial Engineering reported changed their ideas about what value data to keep, (2) the analyst took the initiative to improve records, and (3) the nature of the work changed. For the first three years, for example, quantitative data about the value of alternatives were lacking because the work was primarily strategic and qualitative. Data about the perceived value of the projects, however, were collected until 1994. From 1994 to 1997, the division collected data but used three different survey forms based on direction from the parent division. Beginning in 1998, the parent division again changed emphasis and no longer requested client-perceived value data.
The Nature of the Projects
The 178 projects varied considerably in duration ( Table 2 ). The shortest projects took less than 20 hours and were completed within a few weeks. The longest projects took the better part of a year, both in days duration and in analyst hours. The median project lengths of 54 days and 46 hours are representative. Fifty percent of the projects fell between 27 and 110 days, or between 21 and 90 hours.
The projects were predominantly D and (Table 1) RA and strategy (62 percent). Moreover, the very largest projects are overwhelmingly D and RA and strategy; of the 13 projects that took more than 200 hours; 11 were one of these two types. The top five project types (D and RA, strategy, modeling, portfolio analysis, and trade-offs) made up 85 percent of the projects. They account for 87 percent of the total hours. Despite the predominance of the top five project types, the variety of types listed and the descriptions of the results show that Kodak's D and RA group performed a wide variety of tasks related to decision making. Although not reported here in detail, these projects represent work done for 30 different units at Kodak. Particularly heavy users were the mediamanufacturing functional unit, the utilities functional unit, and the professional business unit. They accounted for almost 50 percent of the projects.
The Value of the Projects
Valuing DA projects can be problematic.
We measured the incremental value of each analysis on the basis of expected net present values (ENPV) of the alternatives analyzed. Thus, we evaluated the alternatives as of the time the decisions were made but before any outcomes occurred. This is the final point at which we had parallel value estimates for the alternatives; waiting for real outcome results would have led to an actual value only for the chosen alternative. One way to estimate the bottom-line contribution of DA would be to calculate the difference between the ENPV of the DA-recommended alternative and the ENPV of the momentum strategy, the alternative that the firm would have followed without analysis. Although this may appear to be the best approach, it has drawbacks. For example, it requires identification and evaluation of the momentum strategy, which may not be apparent, especially if the problem concerns new technology, markets, or products. If a momen-tum strategy can be identified, subsequent modeling and analysis may reveal previously hidden uncertainties or downstream options, and it may not be obvious how the momentum strategy would react to these. (If DA recommends the momentum strategy, its contribution to the bottom line would be calculated as zero. However, this would ignore any nonquantitative value of the DA project, such as providing better justification or improving communication and corporate commitment.)
Our data set does not include documentation of the momentum strategy, so we considered three other measures that range from conservative to liberal estimates of the value of a project: V 1 is the most conservative estimate, essentially assuming that without the analysis, the firm would have chosen the second-best alternative (as ranked by ENPV). V 2 and V 3 also can be interpreted in suitable ways. In these two cases, the average of ENPVs represents an average of what the decision maker might have achieved without modeling and analysis. V 2 includes the best alternative in the average, whereas V 3 does not; V 3 essentially assumes that the best alternative (after analysis) would not have been chosen without analysis. Thus, V 3 is the most liberal estimate of the value of DA among the three that we considered, while V 2 occupies the middle ground.
For 38 of the 178 projects, our records included the ENPV for each alternative considered. Although not shown here, the 38 projects varied widely in the ENPV of alternatives considered, ranging in magnitude from $100 thousand to over $2 billion. (Table 1 shows the calculated values according to our three measures.)
For the conservative V 1 , the average per project is $6.65 million (M), standard deviation $12.26M, and total (for all 38 projects) of $253M (Table 3 ). This contrasts with the corresponding figures for V 2 (average $12.82M, standard deviation $35.03M, and total $487M) and the more liberal V 3 (average $16.35M, standard deviation $41.81M, and total $621M). All three distributions are somewhat skewed: For example, the minimum for V 2 is 0, 25th percentile $0.6M, median $2.4M, 75th percentile $9.3M, and maximum $209M.
The calculations above include all 38 projects. Project 99-12, however, was an extreme outlier. Its alternatives had the largest ENPVs (all six well above $1.5 billion), giving V 1 ‫ס‬ $59M, V 2 ‫ס‬ $209M, and V 3 ‫ס‬ $251M. Because of the effect that this project had on the average and standard deviation of V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 , we also calculated these summary measures excluding Project 99-12. Excluding 99-12, we obtained average per-project values of $5.24M, $7.52M, and $10.02M for V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 , respectively, and similarly deflated standard deviations.
From any perspective, these data represent substantial added value to the organi- zation. Assuming that the cost of maintaining an analyst over the 10 years was about $1.50 million (or $150K per year), the total value added by these 38 projects was over 300 times the cost, based on measure V 2 . Excluding Project 99-12, the remaining 37 projects were still worth (by V 2 ) more than 185 times the cost.
Nonquantitative Results
The quantitative results discussed above arose from only 21 percent of the 178 projects. What about the others? DA contributed to the organization in many ways (Table 1) . Practicing analysts know that projects do not always lead to complete evaluation of fully developed alternatives. For example, in some Kodak projects the analysts developed weighted-scoring systems. In others, they proposed strategies or portfolios. In some projects, analysts facilitated discussion among managers or stakeholders. In a few projects, they only structured a model that managers used for subsequent analysis. Some projects required only scenario development, brainstorming alternatives, or developing strategy tables.
Although the projects in Table 1 are organized by year (and by far the majority of projects were completed within a year), six led directly to later projects (94-8, 94-12, 96-3, 96-19, 97-19, and 98-15) . Many more were interrelated. Satisfied clients returned for follow-up projects or analyses of related problems or passed on favorable reports to colleagues, thereby leading to further related studies.
Not all of the projects listed in Table 1 were completed. Beginning in 1994, 16 projects were not completed, typically because client focus changed. Other reasons include client transfer, illness, cut-back of funds, or the client's making a gut choice before the project was completed.
We extrapolated from our quantitative results to estimate the total value to Kodak of all DA efforts over the 10 years. We used an average of $7.52 million per project (based on V 2 and excluding Project 99-12) to estimate the value of the 140 nonquantified projects. Using this approach, we estimated that the total value to Kodak of all 178 projects was $1.45 billion. Using V 1 or V 3 instead of V 2 , we obtained corresponding estimates of $923 million and $1.90 billion, respectively. More conservatively, we could discard the 16 projects that were not completed and assume that the remaining 124 without quantitative results were worth on average (per project) 75 percent of the 37 completed projects (again excluding 99-12) with quantitative results. By doing so, we obtained total values of $740 million with V 1 , $976 million with V 2 , and $1.30 billion with V 3 .
Value to the Client
For 58 of the projects, we had data related to clients' perceived value. The firm collected these data sporadically and in a variety of ways over the years. In all cases, though, analysts tried to help clients think about the various ways in which the projects could add value. The appendix shows the form used in 1995. Analysts asked their clients, in filling out this form, to consider such dimensions as cycle time for decision making, quality of plans, implementation speed and effectiveness, and learning of skills on the part of the client. Other sources of value (included on other versions of the feedback forms used at other times) included effectiveness of framing the problem, provision of necessary analytical skills, improvements in the decision-making process (for example, communication and consensus building), and the effects on inventory, project cost, safety, and other intangibles.
The clients' estimates of value for 39 projects range from $2,000 to over $14 million, with an average of $1.14 million, standard deviation of $2.96 million, and a total of $44.64 million (Table 3 ). The contrast with the much higher value estimates based on ENPV is striking, even in comparison with the conservative V 1 . A partial explanation for this contrast may be that V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 yield positive values for DA as long as the ENPV of the best alternative is more than the ENPV of the second best. If it were possible to identify the momentum strategy and it turned out to be the best strategy, however, it could be argued that the value of the analysis should be zero. Another explanation for the lower client estimates is that decision makers may, in hindsight, believe that they knew the best alternative all along, even before any analysis.
Over 54 projects, clients judged that 41 had value greater than cost, and only one had a value lower than its cost (Project 94-24, which was not completed because of illness). Of those with quantitative estimates, the ratios range from a minimum of 0.5 to a high of 1,400.
Clients assigned only one project out of 56 a rating less than five (again Project 94-24) on a 10-point satisfaction scale, and and they rated 43 at eight or better.
Conclusion
DA can be extremely valuable. Even with the limited amount of data we have, and even though the data reflect the mess-iness of collecting field data in an ad hoc way over 10 years, the data clearly show that DA adds value. We have documented at least (by V 1 ) $253 million in added value for projects that led to quantitative results, and we estimated that all the projects taken together may have added well over $1 billion.
Our data also paint a rich picture of the nature and variety of the contributions of DA beyond the direct dollar contribution. Future researchers might try to identify appropriate organizational dimensions that represent such intangibles, along with scientifically valid questionnaires for measuring value along these dimensions.
The data further show a realistic picture of the nature of real-world DA projects. Some are completed and are models of what can be done, but many others are limited in scope. Some are aborted for a variety of reasons, often because a client's focus changes. The latter suggests two things. First, analysts must be nimble to provide analytical support quickly enough to be useful. Second, organizations must have realistic expectations of DA; not all efforts work out perfectly, especially when it comes to developing and analyzing new strategic possibilities for a firm in a rapidly changing environment.
Finally, we wish to emphasize the difficulty of collecting and maintaining a database over many years. We were fortunate to have substantial records, largely as a result of one analyst's efforts over the 10-year period. Analysts wishing to track the value of DA contributions in their firms should document the value of all DA projects and develop an effective recordkeeping process. To show the value added by DA, they must gather appropriate documentation for every project. Data to capture include -Project title, description, and client; -Start and end dates; -Analyst hours and cost per hour; -If practical, identification (and early documentation) of the momentum strategy; -ENPV (or similar) for each alternative studied (if the results are so quantified); -Results or benefits described verbally (drawn from a standard questionnaire); and -Client feedback after the decision but before implementation or outcome.
It may be tempting to try to improve on the system over time, but analysts should keep in mind that inconsistencies can make the data less useful. Hence, it is worthwhile at the outset to put thought and effort into designing the system.
To implement the system, analysts must establish effective record-keeping procedures and follow them consistently year after year. All analysts must be trained, motivated, and supported in the datacollection process, and clients should be educated in the importance of the datacollection discipline. An effective process further includes management of personnel turnover in the analysis group. As new analysts are hired, they must be trained, and as analysts leave, their records must be secured.
What does the future hold for DA at Kodak? Robert Kwit retired in 2001, and the other analyst is nearing retirement. They have been effective in proliferating DA concepts, and some individuals in the company use these techniques. Neverthe-less, no successors for these analysts have been identified.
Kodak has no mandate that its employees must use DA techniques for research or capital-program evaluations. Project leaders rather than vice presidents are the typical initiators of DA projects. This makes it unlikely that analysts will apply DA and consistently collect data for evaluating the DA process. Kodak's commitment to a standard organizational decision-making protocol could improve this situation. For example, General Motor's dialogue decision process [Barraba 1994; Matheson and Matheson 1998 ] is such a protocol. Sharpe and Keelin [1998] describe a similar one for SmithKline Beecham. Adopting such a protocol would facilitate the collection of evaluation data and ensure that the organization follows good decision-making practice.
APPENDIX IE Contract Closing/Feedback Form
Please help complete this form in order to improve the quality of services we provide. 
